diff --git a/packages/cms-admin/src/app/api/lens-session/route.ts b/packages/cms-admin/src/app/api/lens-session/route.ts
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7b867ed2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/packages/cms-admin/src/app/api/lens-session/route.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
+import { SignJWT } from "jose";
+
+/**
+ * F151 — Lens mint-endpoint (fleet `mintEndpoint` standard).
+ *
+ * `POST /api/lens-session`
+ * - Auth: `Authorization: Bearer <LENS_MINT_SECRET>` → 401 on missing/wrong.
+ *   This secret ONLY authorizes minting a lens session; it is NOT an admin token.
+ * - Mints a short-lived (~10 min), read-only `cms-session` JWT for the dedicated
+ *   lens principal (`lens@webhouse.app`, role admin so it can RENDER admin
+ *   surfaces — never cb@webhouse.dk, never a real user). Read-only is enforced by
+ *   the `lens:true` write-guard in proxy.ts, NOT by the role.
+ * - Returns a Playwright `storageState` the Lens daemon applies verbatim.
+ *
+ * Contract: broberg-ai/cardmem/docs/LENS-MINT-ENDPOINT.md
+ */
+
+const TTL_SECONDS = 600; // ~10 minutes — cookie + JWT share this expiry
+
+function getJwtSecret(): Uint8Array {
+  // Same secret + fallback as proxy.ts so the minted cookie validates 1:1.
+  return new TextEncoder().encode(
+    process.env.CMS_JWT_SECRET ?? "cms-dev-secret-change-me-in-production",
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Cookie domain from the request Host (or an explicit LENS_COOKIE_DOMAIN) —
+ * NEVER the bound address. On Fly the app binds 0.0.0.0; deriving the domain
+ * from the socket would store the cookie under "0.0.0.0" and the browser would
+ * never send it to the real host → a silent false-green capture of the public
+ * shell. (cardmem mint-endpoint doc, sa 2026-06-05.)
+ */
+function cookieDomain(request: NextRequest): string {
+  const explicit = process.env.LENS_COOKIE_DOMAIN;
+  if (explicit) return explicit;
+  return (request.headers.get("host") ?? "").split(":")[0];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Active org/site for the minted session so site-scoped surfaces render instead
+ * of an empty workspace. Env-driven (LENS_ACTIVE_ORG/LENS_ACTIVE_SITE); when
+ * unset, callers can target a site per-surface via `?site=<id>` (proxy resolves
+ * it). Kept env-only to avoid a registry dependency in the mint path.
+ */
+function resolveActiveSite(): { org: string; site: string } | null {
+  const org = process.env.LENS_ACTIVE_ORG;
+  const site = process.env.LENS_ACTIVE_SITE;
+  return org && site ? { org, site } : null;
+}
+
+export async function POST(request: NextRequest) {
+  const secret = process.env.LENS_MINT_SECRET;
+  const authHeader = request.headers.get("authorization");
+  const bearer = authHeader?.startsWith("Bearer ") ? authHeader.slice(7).trim() : null;
+  if (!secret || !bearer || bearer !== secret) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, { status: 401 });
+  }
+
+  const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+  const expires = now + TTL_SECONDS;
+  const token = await new SignJWT({
+    sub: "lens",
+    email: "lens@webhouse.app",
+    name: "Lens",
+    role: "admin",
+    lens: true,
+  })
+    .setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" })
+    .setIssuedAt(now)
+    .setExpirationTime(expires)
+    .sign(getJwtSecret());
+
+  const domain = cookieDomain(request);
+  const sessionCookie = {
+    name: "cms-session",
+    value: token,
+    domain,
+    path: "/",
+    httpOnly: true,
+    secure: true,
+    sameSite: "Lax" as const,
+    expires,
+  };
+
+  const cookies: Array<typeof sessionCookie> = [sessionCookie];
+  const active = resolveActiveSite();
+  if (active) {
+    // active-org/site are read client-side too → not httpOnly (matches the app).
+    cookies.push({ ...sessionCookie, name: "cms-active-org", value: active.org, httpOnly: false });
+    cookies.push({ ...sessionCookie, name: "cms-active-site", value: active.site, httpOnly: false });
+  }
+
+  return NextResponse.json({ cookies, origins: [] });
+}
+
+export function GET() {
+  return NextResponse.json({ error: "Method not allowed" }, { status: 405 });
+}
diff --git a/packages/cms-admin/src/lib/require-role.ts b/packages/cms-admin/src/lib/require-role.ts
index 0b193361..44ede3fb 100644
--- a/packages/cms-admin/src/lib/require-role.ts
+++ b/packages/cms-admin/src/lib/require-role.ts
@@ -23,8 +23,11 @@ export async function getSiteRole(): Promise<UserRole | null> {
   const session = await getSessionUser(cookieStore);
   if (!session) return null;
 
-  // Dev/API/service tokens carry their role in the JWT — no team lookup needed
-  if (session.sub === "dev-token" || session.sub === "service-token") return session.role;
+  // Dev/API/service/lens tokens carry their role in the JWT — no team lookup needed.
+  // F151: the lens principal (sub "lens") has no team membership; its admin role
+  // comes from the minted JWT so it can render every surface (read-only is the
+  // proxy.ts write-guard's job, not the role's).
+  if (session.sub === "dev-token" || session.sub === "service-token" || session.sub === "lens") return session.role;
 
   const members = await getTeamMembers();
   const membership = members.find((m) => m.userId === session.sub);
diff --git a/packages/cms-admin/src/proxy.ts b/packages/cms-admin/src/proxy.ts
index fb8bd9f2..e9ad8f2f 100644
--- a/packages/cms-admin/src/proxy.ts
+++ b/packages/cms-admin/src/proxy.ts
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ const PUBLIC_PREFIXES = [
   "/api/admin/invitations/", // Invite accept flow (user not yet logged in)
   "/api/cms/scheduled/calendar.ics", // Auth via ?token= query param
   "/api/mcp",               // MCP servers have their own auth (Bearer token)
+  "/api/lens-session",      // F151 Lens mint-endpoint — bearer-authed (LENS_MINT_SECRET); it MINTS the session
   "/api/publish-scheduled", // Called by cron/instrumentation, no user session
   "/api/beam/receive/",     // Live Beam receive — token-authenticated (not session)
   "/api/mobile/",           // F07 webhouse.app mobile — Bearer JWT in header, no cookies (handlers enforce auth themselves)
@@ -261,7 +262,13 @@ export async function proxy(request: NextRequest) {
   }
 
   try {
-    await jwtVerify(token, getJwtSecret());
+    const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, getJwtSecret());
+    // F151: the Lens principal is read-only — block every mutating method.
+    // No-op for all real users (no `lens` claim); the only read-only boundary
+    // for the minted lens session (its role is admin so surfaces still render).
+    if (payload.lens === true && ["POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"].includes(request.method)) {
+      return NextResponse.json({ error: "Lens session is read-only" }, { status: 403 });
+    }
     return forwardOk();
   } catch (err) {
     // RSC prefetch with invalid token — don't redirect, just reject silently